Abstract. Development of the C-light verication system is accompanied by various case studies. We have already demonstrated the applicability of our system to some examples from verication competitions. Those programs are connected to verication-dicult issues but, as a rule, they are represented by articial or trivial pieces of code. Now we can address the more realistic tests. The rst series of experiments is based on fragments of the input analyzer/translator of the C-light system. The trials include axiomatization of problematic domains in the prover Simplify, the development of ACSL annotations and inductive reuse of already specied standard library routines. Thus the rst step to a self-applicable C program verication system has been taken.
Introduction
As opposed to traditional testing, the deductive verication represents a formal way to examine the program correctness. But what about correctness of the verication system itself ?
The answer to this question can consist of two main parts:
1. Since the verication methods are based on some mathematical concepts (sets, relations, calculi, etc.), their properties can be formally proved. For example, the proof of axiomatic semantics soundness is quite a traditional practice [1] . However, these proofs are usually performed by hand.
The assistance of automatic theorem provers can contribute signicantly to their trustworthiness. The examples of such mechanical proofs are much more uncommon, though some researchers obtained remarkable results [9, 10] .
2. The program implementations of those theoretical methods should also be checked thoroughly. And again, in addition to usual testing, formal verication here looks desirable. In particular, if the verication system is implemented in the target language, then its self-verication could be an ultimate check. Speaking about the C language, we are not aware of such a self-applied system.
In the Laboratory of Theoretical Programming (IIS) we are developing the C-light verication system. The C-light language covers the major part of the previous standard (C99). In order to avoid the problems of Hoare's logic for the full C, we translate the input programs in a restricted core called C-kernel. The verication condition generator for C-kernel produces lemmas (verication conditions, VCs), while the interactive prover Simplify tries to discharge them. Taking into account the importance of correctness, we formally proved some properties of composing parts of our approach [8] .
We plan to check those proofs in the future using a higher order logics prover (like HOL, for example).
Practical testing of a verication system is related to the choice of case studies. Previously, we demonstrated [7, 11] that our prototype system is powerful enough to verify some programs from a recognized collection of verication challenges [6] or examples from verication competition suite [3] . These programs are usually very simple or articial.
Now it is time for more realistic experiments, which is possible thanks to recent studies. First, the method of formal verication condition explanation and error localization was developed for C-light [12] . Whereas VCs for simple programs are comprehensible even for a pen-and-paper proof, verication of a real code requires the automatic assistance. Even so, counterexamples
given by a prover may be unexpectedly complex. The approach mentioned above simplies analysis when something goes wrong. Second, the specications written in ACSL [2] were developed for a part of the Standard C library [13] . Every meaningful C program relies on library routines, so these annotations are an important prerequisite.
The self-verication goal has suggested a new test suite to us. The code examples considered in this paper are fragments of the input module of our system. This module translates a C-light program into an equivalent Ckernel program. In fact, it is implemented in C++ using API of the compiler Clang. Thus the complete verication is unachievable; however it is rich in code expressible in C-light, which makes our translator a good test subject.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains three examples from the test suite with our comments attached. An overview of verication prerequisites is given in Section 3. They include ACSL annotations and logical axiomatizations. The verication results are summarized in Section 4. Section 5 is a conclusion of the paper.
The chosen fragments of a translator
Here we present three functions from the translator source code. We also give some explanations, so that reader could match them against annotations.
The annotations themselves will be described later in Section 3.
The function deleteSpaces
This function takes a null-terminated string as its input and erases all blank symbols in the head and tail of the string. blank symbols are implicitly removed from consideration. In the second loop, we also decrease length and increase the string pointer until it points to the leftmost basic source character. After that we allocate memory for the resulting string and copy the specication body into it.
The function replace
As an intermediate program representation in our system, we use a special prex notation. Thus the verication condition generator, which is a standalone program, can easily parse it using a recursive descent. In the prex form the type speciers an type qualiers are separated by the character '_' The function replace takes a string str as an input. A single loop is used to check all characters replacing spaces with '_'. In fact, the resulting string does not require another conversion when the prex form is generated.
The function getBlockID
According to the axiomatic semantics of C-kernel, every compound statement should have a unique identier. During translation into prex form, 
Verication prerequisites
To verify a C-light program, we need some additional information. First of all, a program should have specications. All library types and functions addressed in the program require their own specications. Finally, the concepts from the current problematic domain should be axiomatized so that the prover Simplify could process them.
ACSL annotations
We use ACSL as a specication language. The paper's volume does not allow us to give a detailed description of this language. Instead, we explain the specications of our examples. More information about ACSL can be found in [2] .
deleteSpaces. The ACSL annotations are written in special C comments beginning with '/*@' in contrast to simple comments. The most important ACSL concept is the function contract. The function deleteSpaces on Page 87 is preceded by such a contract.
The function pre-condition is given in the requires clause. We need a correctly allocated string str as an input. This is exactly what the predicate \valid_string says.
It is possible to specify that global variables do not change during the execution of deleteSpaces. The term \nothing in the assigns clause means that the function has no visible side-eects.
The function post-condition is expressed by the ensures clause. In the presence of several clauses, it means that they are combined by conjunction.
The only reason to use many entries is the reader's convenience. The built-in function \old is used to address the function arguments in the pre-state (i.e. before the invocation). The function \base_addr denotes the pointer to the string head.
So, the post-condition demands that, at the end of the function body, the pointer str points somewhere within the limits of the original string. Also the length of the resulting string, which is stored in the variable length, can be shorter than the original string length. Finally, either the resulting value is a null pointer or it points to the same substring as str does at the end.
The function body contains two loops, so two loop invariants are introduced. The rst one states that, at every iteration, the value of length should be nonnegative and less than the current length of the string str and also the character str[length -1] shold be a blank symbol. Actually, pattern matching for escape sequences in invariant is unnecessary, since it can be deduced from specications of the library function isspace. But, to complete the picture, we made it explicit. Also, we suppose that programs are created by a wise user, so we do not take into account exotic escape sequences, like`\a' or`\b'. The second invariant claims that the length of a new string does not exceed the length of the string str and the pointer str is within the limits of the original string.
replace. This function is simpler than the previous one, but, in terms of logic, it is more complex because it applies to quantiers.
The pre-condition on Page 88 is the same \valid_string.
However, some global objects can change during execution of replace and this fact is reected in the assigns clause. Moreover, in ACSL it species that a function is not allowed to change memory locations other than those explicitly listed. Also note that ACSL provides a convenient way to specify the sets (regions) of values (objects).
The post-condition simply says that every blank symbol of the original string is replaced by the character '_'. The shared pre-condition (Page 89) expresses the expected limits for id. The assigns clause says that id is the only object which can change during execution of getBlockID.
Behavior somewhere_in_the_middle corresponds to a situation when the value of id is within capacity of the type unsigned int. Then a new value of id is by one greater than the previous value. Note that the statement about the resulting string required a trick. Indeed, we used the library function names in specications (like strcmp) thus turning them into logical functions.
This works well for the functions with xed parameter lists. However, we appealed to the function sprintf to transform an integer into its string representation, and that function is variadic. To avoid inevitable problems, we use the logical function ltoa for the same task. This logical name has no direct implementation in the standard library, but it serves as an inverse to the library function atol. One would think that the function itoa (as a reverse to atoi) could be appropriate. But the variable id is unsigned, so we need the type long int to avoid dangerous coercions from unsigned int into int.
Behavior too_many_blocks models the situation when increment of id results in integer overow. So, we return the NULL pointer instead.
In addition, we stipulate that this pair of behaviors is exhaustive.
To conclude this section, let us note the convenience of ACSL. Like its ancestor, the specication language JML, it is based on the idea of using the target language syntax for its own expressions. An immediate gain is that specications become rather understandable for ordinary programmers, who, as a rule, are not eager to learn formalisms used in the verication theory.
Library specications and axiomatics
Recently we developed the ACSL specications for a subset of the Standard C library. Moreover, basing on these specications, several library functions were successfully veried [7] . Since our three programs are concentrated mainly on character and string manipulations (and memory management, sometimes), let us consider the corresponding examples.
It should be noted that specications for the library are not limited to functional contracts only. ACSL provides a way to develop logical functions and predicates which can be used later during the proof stage.
ctype.h Here, let us restrict ourselves to the minimal locale. Then, the following logical predicates should be obvious, especially for the reader familiar with the C language.
#include "limits.h" #include "stdio.h" // if locale = "C" /*@ predicate ISDIGIT(int _c) = (_c >= '0' && _c <= '9'); predicate ISLOWER(int _c) = (_c >= 'a' && _c <= 'z'); predicate ISUPPER(int _c) = (_c >= 'A' && _c <= 'Z');
predicate ISALPHA(int _c) = (ISUPPER(_c) || ISLOWER(_c)); predicate ISALNUM(int _c) = (ISALPHA(_c) || ISDIGIT(_c)); ... */ As it was said before, the ACSL language encourages the use of the C code in its expressions. Now, having these denitions, we can simply specify the standard function which checks whether a character is alphanumerical. /*@ requires 0 <= c <= UCHAR_MAX || c == EOF; ensures \result == ISALNUM(c); */ int isalnum(int c);
As a precondition, we use the comparison of a character with the standard constants . The postcondition states that the returning value is equal to the value of the predicate ISALNUM. Actually, these parameter tests and predicate denitions can constitute an appropriate implementation of isalnum (that is why we omitted its body). So, its verication was eortless indeed.
Dened in limits.h and stdio.h. string.h From the verier's point of view, this could be the best part of the library. Indeed, the functions declared in string.h are not trivial (like those from ctype.h, for example), but at the same time they are merely manipulations on the arrays of characters. This means that they admit portable implementations which do not rely on the system calls or assembly language.
For example, the implementation of the function strcpy accompanied by its ACSL specication looks like : /*@ requires \valid_range(s1,0,strlen(s2)) && valid_string(s2); assigns s1[0..strlen(s2)]; ensures strcmp(s1,s2) == 0 && \result == s1; ensures \base_addr(\result) == \base_addr(s1); */ char *strcpy(char *restrict s1, const char *restrict s2) { char *os1 = s1; //@ ghost int i = 0; /*@ loop invariant \forall integer j; 0 <= j <= i ==> s1[j] == s2[j]; */ while (*s1++ = *s2++) { /*@ ghost i++; */ } return (os1); } stdlib.h One of the most frequently used library parts is the memory management. Here we begin to face the execution environment dependance. As a result, only a partial verication is achievable. It is partial in the sense that we rely on the hypotheses about system calls or assembly language fragments which cannot be validated. However, as an exercise training we tried to verify some articial implementations with a simple memory model. One translation step is hidden from a user. We demonstrate it only to complete the picture.
Note that the method of assigning unique names to auxiliary variables (like x above) during translation is similar to the generation of block identiers. Thus the verication of getBlockID can be useful to us.
To verify a loop is to show that its body preserves a loop invariant. So the VCG will take the invariant from Page 87 and the control expression (can be omitted due to obvious reasons) as a pre-condition. The same invariant will serve as a post-condition. There are two if-statements, so the proof tree has four leaves VCs. One of them after simplications has the following form:
(IMPLIES (AND (<= 0 (select MD1 (select MeM1 length))) (< (select MD1 (select MeM1 length)) (strlen (old (select MD1 (select MeM1 str))))) (<= (old (select MD1 (select MeM1 str))) (select MD1 (select MeM1 str))) (< (select MD1 (select MeM1 str)) (+ (old (select MD1 (select MeM1 str))) (strlen (old (select MD1 (select MeM1 str)))))) (EQ MeM (store MeM1 x |@nc0|)) (EQ MD2 (store MD1 |@nc0| |@omega|)) (EQ (select MD2 (select MD2 (select MeM str))) |@0|) (EQ MD3 (store MD2 (select MeM x) 0)) (NEQ 0 (select MD3 (select MeM x))) (EQ MD4 (store MD3 (select MeM str) (+ 1 (select MD3 (select MeM str))))) (EQ MD (store MD4 (select MeM length) (-(select MD4 (select MeM length)) 1)))) (AND (<= 0 (select MD (select MeM length))) (< (select MD (select MeM length)) (strlen (old (select MD (select MeM str))))) (<= (old (select MD (select MeM str))) (select MD (select MeM str))) (< (select MD (select MeM str)) (+ (old (select MD (select MeM str))) (strlen (old (select MD (select MeM str))))))) )
As you can see, the original program variables (x, str, ...) acquire wrappings built of names MeM i or MD j . These are so called meta-variables which model the memory in our C-light abstract machine. Details can be found in [8] ; suce it to say that meta-variables behave like arrays or mappings. The Simplify possesses built-in theories for arrays and uninterpreted functions. We may also express some of the logical predicates and functions from Section 3.2 in the LISP-notation, so that Simplify could process strings " .
They can be combined in a le and passed to Simplify as external axioms.
After that Simplify can easily prove our VC:
Simplify-1. Hoare's triple trivially true. However, we must keep that triple in the proof tree because the control is transferred there (goto l;). So we have to nd an invariant for the label l. As soon as an invariant is found, we can safely neglect all VCs that stem from the proof sub-tree of our dummy triple.
Conclusion and future work
The deductive verication is a way to establish formally program correctness. Obviously the verication method itself should be correct. Apart from theoretical soundness, its implementation also requires validation. The situation when a verication system is written in the target language gives us an opportunity to apply it to itself. This task is of great interest in the case of the C language.
This paper describes our rst step towards the veried verier. A series of experiments was performed in order to verify some parts of a translator from C-light into C-kernel. The work included the development of ACSL annotations and axiomatic theories for problematic domains. Three of our case studies were illustrated here.
To emphasize the actuality, let us note that studies related to this eld are almost unknown. In many cases researchers use dierent languages to " For example, a prover should be informed about the properties of strlen.
implement their systems (like the functional O'Caml in WHY [5] ). Others are concentrated on verication of dierent applications (for example, Hyper-V is the main subject of study in the VCC project [4] ).
We plan to continue our work on specication and verication of the components of our system. At the moment, only a restricted functionality is expressible in a pure C. Perhaps we will return from C++ API of the Clang compiler to the standard C in order to achieve an ultimate goal the total verication.
In introductory section we also mentioned one more area of possible research. The formal semantics for C-light and C-kernel could be embedded in some prover based on the higher order logics. After that, some theorems earlier proved manually could be revised with such an automatic assistance.
